



StartFi

Smart Contract Security Audit

Prepared by ShellBoxes

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[Shellboxes.com](https://shellboxes.com)

contact@shellboxes.com

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Scope

The StartFiToken Contract in the StartFi Repository

Repo	Commit Hash
<code>https://github.com/StartFi/token_audit</code>	<code>ce6bcaa3f9255743236f3db530f0f1f9e1ed57ca</code>

Contacts

COMPANY	EMAIL
ShellBoxes	<code>contact@shellboxes.com</code>

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1 Introduction

StartFi engaged ShellBoxes to conduct a security assessment on the StartFiToken beginning on August 6th, 2021 and ending August 12th, 2021. In this report, we detail our methodical approach to evaluate potential security issues associated with the implementation of smart contracts, by exposing possible semantic discrepancies between the smart contract code and design document, and by recommending additional ideas to optimize the existing code. Our findings indicate that the current version of smart contracts can still be enhanced further due to the presence of many security and performance concerns.

This document summarizes the findings of our audit.

1.1 About StartFi

StartFi is an NFT Platform to Help Content Creators Raise Funds for Their Digital Content, Engaging Community to Share Rewards & Revenues.

Issuer	StartFi
Website	https://startfi.io
Type	Solidity Smart Contract
Audit Method	Whitebox

1.2 Approach & Methodology

ShellBoxes used a combination of manual and automated security testing to achieve a balance between efficiency, timeliness, practicability, and correctness within the audit's scope. While manual testing is advised for identifying problems in logic, procedure, and implementation, automated testing techniques help to expand the coverage of smart contracts and can quickly detect code that does not comply with security best practices.

1.2.1 Risk Methodology

Vulnerabilities or bugs identified by ShellBoxes are ranked using a risk assessment technique that considers both the LIKELIHOOD and IMPACT of a security incident. This frame-

work is effective at conveying the features and consequences of technological vulnerabilities.

Its quantitative paradigm enables repeatable and precise measurement, while also revealing the underlying susceptibility characteristics that were used to calculate the Risk scores. A risk level will be assigned to each vulnerability on a scale of 5 to 1, with 5 indicating the greatest possibility or impact.

- Likelihood quantifies the probability of a certain vulnerability being discovered and exploited in the untamed.
- Impact quantifies the technical and economic costs of a successful attack.
- Severity indicates the risk's overall criticality.

Probability and impact are classified into three categories: H, M, and L, which correspond to high, medium, and low, respectively. Severity is determined by probability and impact and is categorized into four levels, namely Critical, High, Medium, and Low.

Impact	High	Critical	High	Medium
	Medium	High	Medium	Low
	Low	Medium	Low	Low
		High	Medium	Low
		Likelihood		

2 Findings Overview

2.1 Summary

The following is a synopsis of our conclusions from our analysis of the StartFiToken implementation. During the first part of our audit, we examine the smart contract source code and run the codebase via a static code analyzer. The objective here is to find known coding problems statically and then manually check (reject or confirm) issues highlighted by the tool. Additionally, we check business logics, system processes, and DeFi-related components manually to identify potential hazards and/or defects.

2.2 Key Findings

In general, these smart contracts are well-designed and constructed, but their implementation might be improved by addressing the discovered flaws, which include , **1** medium-severity, **1** low-severity, **3** informational-severity vulnerabilities.

Vulnerabilities	Severity	Status
A.1. Approve Race Condition	MEDIUM	Acknowledged
A.2. Usage of Block.TimeStamp	LOW	Acknowledged
A.3. Floating Pragma	INFORMATIONAL	Acknowledged
A.4. Use of Inline Assembly	INFORMATIONAL	Acknowledged
A.5. Use of Nonces	INFORMATIONAL	Acknowledged

3 Finding Details

A StartFiToken.sol

A.1 Approve Race Condition [MEDIUM]

Description:

The standard ERC20 implementation contains a widely-known racing condition in its `approve` function, wherein a spender is able to witness the token owner broadcast a transaction altering their approval and quickly sign and broadcast a transaction using `transferFrom` to move the current approved amount from the owner's balance to the spender. If the spender's transaction is validated before the owner's, the spender will be able to get both approval amounts of both transactions.

Code:

Listing 1: StartFiToken.sol

```
62  require(  
63      verifyEIP712(target, hashStruct, v, r, s)  
64      verifyPersonalSign(target, hashStruct, v, r, s)  
65  );  
66  _approve(target, spender, value);  
67  }
```

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 2

Impact - 5

Recommendation:

Override the `_approve` function to use the following definition

Listing 2: StartFiToken

```
function _approve(address delegate, uint256 _currentValue, uint256
    ↪ numTokens) public
override returns (bool) {
    if(_currentValue == allowed[msg.sender][delegate])
    {
        allowed[msg.sender][delegate] = numTokens;
        emit Approval(msg.sender, delegate, numToken);
        return true;
    }
    else return false;
}
```

Status – Acknowledged

The StartFi team acknowledged the risk and chose to use the `increaseAllowance` and `decreaseAllowance` to change the approval amount instead of overwriting it using the `approve` function.

A.2 Usage of Block.Timestamp [LOW]

Description:

`Block.timestamp` is used in the contract. The variable `block` is a set of variables. The timestamp does not always reflect the current time and may be inaccurate. The value of a block can be influenced by miners. Maximal Extractable Value attacks require a timestamp of up to 900 seconds. There is no guarantee that the value is right, all what is guaranteed is that it is higher than the timestamp of the previous block.

Code:

Listing 3: StartFiToken

```
50 require(block.timestamp <= deadline, "AnyswapV3ERC20: Expired permit");
```


Listing 4: StartFiToken

```
74 require(block.timestamp <= deadline, "StartFiToken: Expired permit");
```

Risk Level:

Likelihood – 3

Impact – 2

Recommendation:

You can use an Oracle to get the exact time or verify if a delay of 900 seconds won't destroy the logic of the staking contract.

Status – Acknowledged

The StartFi team accepted the risk and preferred not to use the oracle for the reason that 900 seconds won't have an impact on the business logic.

A.3 Floating Pragma [INFORMATIONAL]

Description:

The contract makes use of the floating-point pragma 0.8.0. Contracts should be deployed using the same compiler version and flags that were used during the testing process. Locking the pragma helps to ensure that contracts are not unintentionally deployed using another pragma, such as an obsolete version, that may introduce issues in the contract system.

Code:

Listing 5: StartFiToken

```
3 pragma solidity >=0.8.0;  
4 pragma experimental SMTChecker;
```

Risk Level:

Likelihood – 2

Impact – 1

Recommendation:

Consider locking the pragma version. It is advised that floating pragma not be used in production. Both `truffle-config.js` and `hardhat.config.js` support locking the pragma version.

Status – Acknowledged

A.4 Use of Inline Assembly [INFORMATIONAL]

Description:

Inline assembly is a way to access the EVM at a low level. This discards several important safety features in Solidity.

Code:

Listing 6: StartFiToken

```
uint chainId;  
assembly {  
    chainId := chainId  
}
```

Risk Level:

Likelihood – 2

Impact – 1

Recommendation:

When possible, do not use inline assembly because it is a manner to access to the EVM at a low level. An attacker could bypass many important safety features of Solidity.

Status - Acknowledged

A.5 Use of Nonces [INFORMATIONAL]

Description:

The mapping nonces register how many signatures have been used for a particular holder. When creating the signature, a nonces value needs to be included. When executing the permit, the nonce included must exactly match the number of signatures that have been used so far for that holder.

This ensures that each signature is used only once. All these three conditions together, the PERMIT_TYPEHASH, the DOMAIN_SEPARATOR, and the nonce, make sure that each signature is used only for the intended contract, the intended function, and only once.

Code:

Listing 7: StartFiToken

```
mapping (address => uint256) public nonces;  
constructor(string memory name,
```

Status - Acknowledged

4 Static Analysis (Slither)

Description:

ShellBoxes expanded the coverage of the specific contract areas using automated testing methodologies. Slither, a Solidity static analysis framework, was one of the tools used. Slither was run on all-scoped contracts in both text and binary formats. This tool can be used to test mathematical relationships between Solidity instances statically and variables that allow for the detection of errors or inconsistent usage of the contracts' APIs throughout the entire codebase.

Results:

```
ERC20PresetFixedSupply.constructor(string,string,uint256,address).name (
    ↪ node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/presets/
    ↪ ERC20PresetFixedSupply.sol#25) shadows:
- ERC20.name() (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.
    ↪ sol#60-62) (function)
- IERC20Metadata.name() (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/
    ↪ ERC20/extensions/IERC20Metadata.sol#16) (function)
ERC20PresetFixedSupply.constructor(string,string,uint256,address).symbol
    ↪ (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/presets/
    ↪ ERC20PresetFixedSupply.sol#26) shadows:
- ERC20.symbol() (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/
    ↪ ERC20.sol#68-70) (function)
- IERC20Metadata.symbol() (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/
    ↪ ERC20/extensions/IERC20Metadata.sol#21) (function)
StartFiToken.constructor(string,string,address).name (contracts/
    ↪ StartFiToken.sol#21) shadows:
- ERC20.name() (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.
    ↪ sol#60-62) (function)
- IERC20Metadata.name() (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/
    ↪ ERC20/extensions/IERC20Metadata.sol#16) (function)
```

StartFiToken.constructor(string,string,address).symbol (contracts/

↳ StartFiToken.sol#22) shadows:

- ERC20.symbol() (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/
↳ ERC20.sol#68-70) (function)
- IERC20Metadata.symbol() (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/
↳ ERC20/extensions/IERC20Metadata.sol#21) (function)

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation>

↳ #local-variable-shadowing

StartFiToken.permit(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint8,bytes32,

↳ bytes32) (contracts/StartFiToken.sol#49-63) uses timestamp for

↳ comparisons

Dangerous comparisons:

- require(bool,string)(block.timestamp <= deadline,AnyswapV3ERC20:
↳ Expired permit) (contracts/StartFiToken.sol#50)

StartFiToken.transferWithPermit(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint8,

↳ bytes32,bytes32) (contracts/StartFiToken.sol#73-92) uses

↳ timestamp for comparisons

Dangerous comparisons:

- require(bool,string)(block.timestamp <= deadline,StartFiToken:
↳ Expired permit) (contracts/StartFiToken.sol#74)

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation>

↳ #block-timestamp

StartFiToken.constructor(string,string,address) (contracts/StartFiToken.

↳ sol#21-39) uses assembly

- INLINE ASM (contracts/StartFiToken.sol#27-29)

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation>

↳ #assembly-usage

Different versions of Solidity are used:

- Version used: ['>=0.8.0', '^0.8.0']
- ^0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol#3)

- ^0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol
↳ #3)
- ^0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/
↳ ERC20Burnable.sol#3)
- ^0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/
↳ IERC20Metadata.sol#3)
- ^0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/presets/
↳ ERC20PresetFixedSupply.sol#2)
- ^0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Context.sol#3)
- >=0.8.0 (contracts/StartFiToken.sol#3)
- SMTChecker (contracts/StartFiToken.sol#4)

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation>
↳ #different-pragma-directives-are-used

Pragma version^0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/
↳ ERC20.sol#3) allows old versions

Pragma version^0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/
↳ IERC20.sol#3) allows old versions

Pragma version^0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/
↳ extensions/ERC20Burnable.sol#3) allows old versions

Pragma version^0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/
↳ extensions/IERC20Metadata.sol#3) allows old versions

Pragma version^0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/
↳ presets/ERC20PresetFixedSupply.sol#2) allows old versions

Pragma version^0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Context
↳ .sol#3) allows old versions

Pragma version>=0.8.0 (contracts/StartFiToken.sol#3) allows old versions
solc-0.8.0 is not recommended for deployment

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation>
↳ #incorrect-versions-of-solidity

Variable StartFiToken.DOMAIN_SEPARATOR (contracts/StartFiToken.sol#14)
↳ is not in mixedCase

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation>
↳ #conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions

Redundant expression "this (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/
↳ Context.sol#21)" inContext (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/
↳ utils/Context.sol#15-24)

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation>
↳ #redundant-statements

StartFiToken.constructor(string,string,address) (contracts/StartFiToken.
↳ sol#21-39) uses literals with too many digits:
- ERC20PresetFixedSupply(name,symbol,100000000 * 1000000000000000000,
↳ owner) (contracts/StartFiToken.sol#24)

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation>
↳ #too-many-digits

name() should be declared external:

- ERC20.name() (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.
↳ sol#60-62)

symbol() should be declared external:

- ERC20.symbol() (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/
↳ ERC20.sol#68-70)

decimals() should be declared external:

- ERC20.decimals() (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/
↳ ERC20.sol#85-87)

totalSupply() should be declared external:

- ERC20.totalSupply() (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20
↳ /ERC20.sol#92-94)

balanceOf(address) should be declared external:

- ERC20.balanceOf(address) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/
↳ ERC20/ERC20.sol#99-101)

transfer(address,uint256) should be declared external:

- ERC20.transfer(address,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts
↳ /token/ERC20/ERC20.sol#111-114)

```

approve(address,uint256) should be declared external:
- ERC20.approve(address,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/
  ↳ token/ERC20/ERC20.sol#130-133)
transferFrom(address,address,uint256) should be declared external:
- ERC20.transferFrom(address,address,uint256) (node_modules/
  ↳ @openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol#148-156)
increaseAllowance(address,uint256) should be declared external:
- ERC20.increaseAllowance(address,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/
  ↳ contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol#170-173)
decreaseAllowance(address,uint256) should be declared external:
- ERC20.decreaseAllowance(address,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/
  ↳ contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol#189-195)
burn(uint256) should be declared external:
- ERC20Burnable.burn(uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/
  ↳ token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20Burnable.sol#19-21)
burnFrom(address,uint256) should be declared external:
- ERC20Burnable.burnFrom(address,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/
  ↳ contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20Burnable.sol#34-39)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation
  ↳ #public-function-that-could-be-declared-external
. analyzed (7 contracts with 78 detectors), 31 result(s) found

```


5 Automated Security Scan

Description:

ShellBoxes used automated security scanners to assist with detection of well-known security issues and to identify vulnerabilities, on the smart contract we used MythX. MythX is a security analysis API that allows anyone to create purpose-built security tools for smart contract developers.

Results:

Report for StartFiToken.sol
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/fed30535-282c-42af-9972-9abb0481618d>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
3	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
33	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "*" discovered
77	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "++" discovered
115	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "++" discovered

Report for openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/fed30535-282c-42af-9972-9abb0481618d>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
159	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "-" discovered
178	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "+" discovered
200	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "-" discovered
233	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "-" discovered
235	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "+=" discovered
256	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "+=" discovered
257	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "+=" discovered
282	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "-" discovered
284	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "-=" discovered

Report for openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20Burnable.sol
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/fed30535-282c-42af-9972-9abb0481618d>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
38	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "-" discovered

Conclusion:

Most of the vulnerabilities found by the analysis have already been addressed by the smart contract code review.

6 Conclusion

We examined the design and implementation of StartFI Token in this audit. The present code base is well-organized. We would much appreciate any constructive input or ideas regarding our methodology, audit findings, or potential scope/coverage gaps in this report.



For a Contract Audit, contact us at contact@shellboxes.com